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The Law and Politics of Transboundary
Air Pollution: The European Experience

By Armin Rosencranz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The thesis of my talk this afternoon is that in the field of transboundary air pollution, notwithstanding the Trial Smelter case, Principle
21 of the Stockholm Convention, or any other general principles of international law, international law is ineffective and invariably gives way to
considerations of national and international politics. Nations control pollution only when it is in their national interest to do so, not because they
have obligations under international law to do so.
I'd like to compare the North American acid rain experience with
that of Europe. There are at least four similarities. Scientific uncertainty
prevails in both regions. Those responsible for the production of electric
power, whether private or public authorities, have carped at the absence
of complete proof of the causes and effects of acid rain.
Secondly, in both regions, with the exceptions of Canada, Norway
and Sweden, public apathy about the problem is prevalent. Recent polls
have indicated that while in Canada three out of four citizens are aware
of acid rain, in the United States the ratio is only one in five. Similar
divergences exist between Norway and Sweden on the one hand and the
rest of Europe on the other.
Thirdly, no economic interests are yet seriously harmed, with the exceptions of sport fishing and tourism. These, however, aren't politically
powerful economic interests like the agricultural or timber industries.
Finally, in neither region is there any willingness to invest the necessary capital to take remedial action through control technologies.
The two regions differ strikingly in air pollution control strategies.
Unlike the United States which relies heavily on regulation, new source
performance standards, and the berst available control technology, Europe relies primarily on low-cost sulphur reduction strategies such as dispersion through tall stacks, use of low sulphur oil and coal, and an increasing reliance on nuclear power.
I have gained some expertise about an international agreement called
the ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Both
* Former Director, German Marshall Fund Study of Transboundary Air Pollution, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.
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Canada and the United States were signatories to that convention. Let
me tell you how that agreement came about and what it signifies.
II.

THE ECE CONVENTION

At the 1975 East-West meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki, President Leonid Brezhnev of
the Soviet Union challenged his fellow conferees to reach multilateral solutions on three pressing problems affecting all of Europe: energy, transport and the environment.
In the ensuing months, there seemed little likelihood that anyone
would pick up Brezhnev's cue. The energy issue is, of course, fraught with
economic and political considerations. Each country has always looked to
its own needs, and, if those needs were not met domestically, they have
struck the necessary bargains bilaterally with oil-producing nations.
Moreover, it was widely believed that any East-West accord on energy
could put the Western European nations at a serious disadvantage. While
western nations would conscientiously endeavor to adhere to the terms of
any accord, including disclosure of national energy production and consumption data, the Eastern European nations were expected to withhold
such useful information.
The Rhine-Main-Danube Canal relates to the issue of transport. It is
a canal wholly within and built by West Germany connecting two international rivers, the Rhine and the Danube. Placing the transport issue on
the agenda of any East-West meeting would have given the socialist nations an opportunity to assert that such an important inter-European
trade and transportation resource should be internationalized. Accordingly, the West German government declined to offer any such
opportunity.
Of Brezhnev's three agenda items, the environment was by far the
most innocuous. But, Swedish and Norwegian environmental officials saw
in Brezhnev's Helsinki speech an opportunity for international discussion,
negotiation and perhaps resolution of a problem very important to them:
the long-range transport of air pollutants.
Three years earlier, at the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm, the Swedish delegation focused international attention on the problem of lake acidification from airborne pollutants. This
phenomenon had first been discovered in the early 1950's and its unchecked increase had begun to alarm Scandinavian environmentalists.
Airborne pollutants, especially sulphur oxides, were being imported into
the Scandinavian atmosphere from elsewhere in Europe. In Norway, as
much as 90 percent of the sulphur in the atmosphere originated outside
the country.
At the time of the Brezhnev initiative, only one international organization had shown any interest in acid rain. This was the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, whose mem-
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bers include Western and Southern Europe, Canada, the United States,
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Since 1972, the OECD had engaged
in numerous studies and produced several volumes on transfrontier pollution. The OECD was, in diplomatic parlance, a talking shop. Its policy
pronouncements were merely recommendations to member countries.
Norway and Sweden recognized that the OECD had never had and never
would be given power to enforce its recommendations.
The European Economic Community, consisting of the nine Western
European members of the Common Market-West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Britain and Denmark-had considered various measures to control and abate sulphur dioxide, the precursor of acid rain. But these nine countries were all heavy
producers of S02 and were unlikely to subscribe to any measure that
would compromise their industrial productivity. Moreover, Norway and
Sweden, which were not members of the Community, held no strong bargaining position.
Having decided to seize upon the Brezhnev initiative, Scandinavian
diplomats next had to find an appropriate forum. They settled on the
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), housed in the old Palais
des Nations in Geneva. All European nations, East and West, are members of the ECE and anachronistically, so are Canada and the United
States. The ECE, however, was also thought by some to be just another
talking shop. Finally it was decided to use the ECE because Swedish
scientists had determined that up to one-third of the sulfur compounds in
Sweden's atmosphere originated in Eastern Europe-primarily East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This is especially the case in the winter months when winds tend to blow northwestward. Accordingly, any
hope for a substantial control of acid precipitation in Scandinavia would
depend on Eastern European cooperation.
Serious negotiations were undertaken at the ECE in 1977. Delegates
from Sweden and Norway pressed for a tough agreement to hold the line
against further S02 increases. This came to be known as the "standstill"
clause. In addition, S02 pollution levels were to be abated by fixed,
across-the-board percentages. This latter provision was called the
"rollback" clause. Together, they became the Nordic Proposal.
The main resistance to the Nordic Proposal came not from the Eastern European polluting nations, but from the large polluters of Western
Europe, especially West Germany and Great Britain. They talked with
one voice through the European community. West Germany was skeptical
of the entire enterprise and especially of any attempt to empower the
ECE Secretariat to make troublesome inquiries of signatory nations.
Britain discharges more sulphur oxides into the air than any other
country in Europe. British scientists grant that the Scandinavians are
troubled by acidified lakes and soils, but question whether the 3.2 million
tons of sulphur dioxide discharged by Britain's power plants are to blame.
They are not even convinced that there is such a phenomenon as acid
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rain. In the words of Britain's former Minister of the Environment, "Britain is not willing to pay the high costs of large-scale reduction until its
share of the responsibility for sulphur fallout is firmly established." Privately, some British environmental officials concede that up to 25 percent
of Norway's problem may originate in Britain, but argue that more research is needed before action is taken.
As negotiations proceeded at the ECE through 1978, the British and
German positions began to harden, especially against the standstill and
rollback provisions of the Nordic Proposal.
The United States' role in these negotiations was both ambivalent
and ambiguous. Several U.S. representatives tried to mediate between the
Community and the Scandinavians, although the United States was no
less ready than the Community to accept a standstill or rollback provision. The United States could not agree to any such change in existing
policies without new Congressional authority.
At the beginning of 1979, a high level meeting of ECE member states
was set for November, at which time it was hoped that an agreement on
transboundary air pollution would be presented and signed. In the early
months of 1979, negotiations over the terms of the draft convention became tense. The West Germans successfully resisted the standstill and
rollback positions. They also required that the words "economically feasible" be added to the Nordic provision that sulphur reduction be achieved
with the best available technology. Even so, the West Germans still felt
uncomfortable with any agreement, and it took the intervention of the
Prime Minister of Sweden, the Foreign Minister of Norway and former
French President Giscard D'Estaing, representing the then-president
country of the Community, to bring Germany to agreement.
The British eventually agreed to go along with the Convention, supposing that their planned increased reliance on sulphur-free North Sea oil
and sulphur-free nuclear energy to generate electric power would bring
about a net reduction in their own sulphur emissions. They felt they
could adhere to the terms of the Convention without changing their existing energy program.
Most ECE countries sent their senior minister responsible for environmental matters to the meeting in Geneva, November 13th through
16th, 1979. It was the first time that senior environmental ministers had
gathered for such a common purpose.
The ECE convention was and is the first and only international multilateral accord on air pollution. It was the first time that a multilateral
convention was signed by an overwhelming majority of ECE member
states at the very meeting at which it was presented, and it was the first
time that the ECE had performed such a significant and constructive
function. The ECE treaty is at best, however, only a very modest step
forward. It depends exclusively on exchanges of information and collaborative research and monitoring of air pollution and rain. Its terms also
provide ample room for evasion.
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Signatories agreed to "endeavor to limit, and as far as possible, gradually reduce" transboundary air pollution (Article 2) by using "the best
available technology economically feasible" (Article 6). Upwind nations
are required to notify and consult with downwind nations if any planned
facilities, such as power plants, are likely to "significantly" increase longrange transboundary air pollution (Article 8). There are no numerical
goals, no standards, limits, timetables or enforcement provisions. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment proclaims that, "States have the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdictional control do not cause damage to the environment of other states." This principle is incorporated in the Convention's
Preamble but not in its text, and West German representatives noted
that their government did not feel bound by any provisions in any
preamble.
Have the Scandinavians gained anything with the signing of the ECE
Convention? First, they have gained international recognition of the acid
rain problem. Second, they have gained a commitment of the ECE Secretariat and bureaucracy to develop policies and strategies to deal with
transboundary air pollution. Finally, they have achieved the principle of
prior consultation and notification, however difficult it may be to
effectuate.
Erik Lykke, Norway's principal ECE negotiator, concluded somewhat
philosophically, "We don't expect a 50 percent reduction in Europe's
sulphur emissions. We merely expect to slow the increase in those
emissions."
Unlike the United States which relies heavily on regulation, new
source performance standards, and the best available control technology,
Europe relies primarily on low-cost sulphur reduction strategies such as
dispersion through tall stacks, use of low sulphur oil and coal, and an
increasing reliance on nuclear power.
Worth mentioning are two other international pollution control instruments that have come out of Europe. The Nordic Convention of 1974,
signed by Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, which guarantees
equal access to courts and nondiscrimination, but no case dealing with
acid rain has yet come under the Nordic Convention. The European Economic Community, whose nine member States include Western Europe's
major polluters, enacted on June 30, 1980 its long-awaited S02 directive.
The resolution incorporates the ECE formula "to endeavor to limit and
as far as possible gradually reduce air pollution." The SO2 directive of
the EEC is so weak that at least two enviromentally progressive countries, the Netherlands and Denmark, were reluctant to approve it.
III.

PROGNOSIS: LIMITED ABATEMENT BUT INCREASED AWARENESS

The new ECE Convention, backed by general principles of international law, will not abate S02 emissions sufficiently to remedy the trans-
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boundary acid rain problem. Numerous control strategies, policies and
technologies are available, and could be extremely effective, but few nations are willing to bear the cost. Indeed, the pressures today are in the
opposite direction, namely, to relax air quality and emission standards to
make coal-generated electric power more efficient and economical.
The prospects for timely action do not look promising. Sweden and
Norway will undoubtedly call on their fellow ECE signatories to implement the principles of the Convention. The polluting countries will continue to call for proof of damage, identification of specific sources and
resolution of scientific uncertainties. The polluters may propose to bear
the modest costs of liming acidified lakes, an offer which the recipient
countries will scorn as an inadequate substitute for abatement, and as
potentially dangerous to aquatic ecosystems.
No international principles or practices, and certainly not the qualified language of the recent ECE Convention, can compel remedial action.
But many consciousnesses were raised at the Stockholm Convention of
1972 and at all the international meetings and negotiations on environmental matters since then, including the 1979 ECE Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution. The Stockholm Conference led to the creation of
numerous national institutions to protect the environment and made everyone on the public level aware of the acid rain phenomenon, if not of its
danger.
The ECE Convention on transboundary air pollution at least may
keep matters from getting worse and may perhaps make them somewhat
better. The most promising provision is that which requires upwind nations to notify and consult with downwind nations. ECE-mandated exchanges of information may stimulate collaborative research on crop
damage and health effects from sulfate aerosols and acid rain, which in
turn may eventually demonstrate the cost-effectiveness and, indeed, the
necessity of controlling and abating sulphur emissions throughout the industrial world. Ultimately, this would induce responsible officials to revise
upward their estimates of what is economically feasible.
Transboundary air pollution is governed not by international law but
by national self-interest. That self-interest, however, combined with the
consciousness-raising effect of vigorous international discussion and negotiation concerning sulphur pollutants and their potentially irreversible effects can induce thoughtful and enlightened public officials to worry
about and try to abate acid rain for their own nations' welfare.
During 1980, for example, most European countries did reduce their
annual S02 emissions by efficiently employing low-cost sulphur control
strategies such as burning low-sulphur coal and oil, washing coal before
combustion and producing electricity from nuclear sources. West Germany began an ambitious research program dealing with the effects of
acid rain on conifer forests and on buildings and monuments. Britain
used aircraft to track chemically colored S02 emissions from their sources
in Britain to their eventual deposition abroad.
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International organizations and agreements serve the essential function of educating the international political community. They help to
build a consensus about transnational problems and to develop a context
in which sovereign States pursue pro-international policies by perceiving
that it is in their own interest to do so. By making and keeping issues like
transboundary air pollution salient topics for international investigation,
discussion and negotiation, they create a ripple effect. (This is what is
happening, on this side of the Atlantic, with the U.S.-Canada Memorandum of Intent.) International monitoring, data gathering and scientific
research help to form a consensus among scientists that a problem is serious and deserves urgent remedial action. These ripples are bound to
reach policy-makers and concerned citizens and to influence national
agendas.
In this lies the main hope for progress in international environmental
protection generally, and specifically, in the area of transboundary acid
rain pollution.

